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The Three-Fold Significance
of the Blaming Emotions
Zac Cogley
1. INTRODUCTION
Many philosophers working on moral responsibility follow P. F. Strawson
(1982) in understanding claims about someone’s moral responsibility or
the phenomenon of holding people morally responsible in terms of the
appropriateness of a certain class of emotions (Bennett 1980; Watson 1993;
Wallace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; McKenna 1998; Macnamara
2009). But even those who would not follow Strawson in identifying moral
responsibility attributions with the appropriateness of emotions hold that
emotions do play a role in our moral responsibility practices (Scanlon
2008, 143). In spite of this, the significance of the blaming emotions for
moral responsibility has been under-theorized. (I am concerned here with
people’s moral responsibility for their actions or omissions, rather than, for
example, whether in general someone is a morally responsible person.)
In order to fully appreciate the import of the blaming emotions for moral
responsibility we need a more adequate moral psychology. As an initial step,
in this paper I appeal to recent work in psychology of emotion to argue that
the blaming emotions—anger, resentment, and indignation—are significant
for our moral responsibility practices in three different ways.1 They are
important to moral responsibility in appraising people as acting wrongfully,
in communicating the appraisal to perceived wrongdoers, and in sanctioning
people who are appraised as wrongful.2 I also investigate the conditions of
appropriateness of the blaming emotions. My methodology is inspired by
1 While there are positive emotions that are connected to moral responsibility, I focus
on the blaming emotions as they have received much more philosophical and psycho-
logical discussion than have candidate positive emotions like gratitude.
2 An anonymous reviewer points out that these also correspond to three broad
categories of response to wrongdoing. I agree—in fact, I think we categorize responses
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recent philosophical attention to reasons for attitudes: for example, the
reasons in favor of believing a proposition (Shah 2003) or blaming another
person (Hieronymi 2004). There has also been some attention—though not
nearly as much—to the reasons that bear on emotions (D’Arms and Jacobson
2000). As I will demonstrate, the three ways in which the blaming emotions
are significant for our moral responsibility practices are associated with very
different kinds of appropriateness considerations.
My work is also inspired by the fact that although there has been
significant recent attention to the concept of moral responsibility, there is
little agreement about it. Indeed, in one recent attempt to clear the concep-
tual territory, John Martin Fischer and Neal Tognazzini argue that there are
up to thirteen different analytical or conceptual “stages” of moral responsi-
bility attributions, organized (roughly) into two broad categories: attribut-
ibility and accountability (2010). Here they are inspired by Gary Watson’s
(1996) distinction between these two concepts, but urge that conceptual
clarity about moral responsibility requires far more distinctions.3
I am deeply sympathetic to the project of achieving clarity about our
conception of moral responsibility as it is central to making progress on
some of our most vexing issues about moral responsibility, including
whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. However,
I fear that some recent attempts to introduce clarity risk further confusion
because they have not paid sufficient attention to the moral psychology
of the blaming emotions. Not only, then, do I try to enrich our moral
psychological picture of the blaming emotions, but I also link appraisal,
communication, and sanction to representative accounts of moral responsi-
bility. I suggest that each kind of account is inspired by a different way in
which the blaming emotions are significant, and thus each account impli-
citly emphasizes a different consideration of emotional appropriateness.
Fittingness accounts of moral responsibility are linked to appraisal, moral
address accounts correspond to the communicative dimension of the
blaming emotions, and desert accounts of moral responsibility are inspired
by the blaming emotions’ sanctioning role. If I am right, part of the reason
debates about moral responsibility have been so intractable is that many
theorists share the assumption that appropriate blaming emotions are a
reliable indicator of a person’s moral responsibility, while inappropriate
blaming emotions are evidence of a lack of moral responsibility. This makes
it appear as if all parties to the debate are operating with the same
to wrongdoing as appraisals, communications, and sanctions in virtue of their connec-
tion with the blaming emotions. Space precludes making that argument here.
3 Fischer and Tognazzini’s analysis places consideration of the blaming emotions
squarely into the accountability category. My analysis here complicates that categorization.
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conception of moral responsibility in mind. However, because different
accounts are implicitly linked to different kinds of appropriateness, the
wide agreement that the appropriateness of the blaming emotions is
revealing of moral responsibility obscures significant disagreements about
the concept and the conditions for its application that emerge with a more
refined focus.4
While discussion of all of the blaming emotions is common, theorists
often emphasize one or two to the exclusion of others. For example,
R. J. Wallace speaks of indignation and resentment (Wallace 1994) as
does Tamler Sommers (2007), while Derk Pereboom has remarked that
“of all the attitudes associated with moral responsibility, it is anger that
seems most closely connected with it” (Pereboom 2001, 208).5 In what
follows, I assume that from a psychological standpoint, resentment and
indignation are ways of being angry.
2 . APPRAISAL
An important strand of contemporary psychological research on emotion
seeks to determine characteristic appraisals that are assumed to elicit distinct-
ive emotions.6 “Appraisal” refers to a person’s evaluation or interpretation
of a situation. According to this research, different emotions are caused
by distinct appraisals. For example, Richard Lazarus claims that anger is
produced by a person’s appraisal of a “personal slight or demeaning offense”
(1991, 223), while in a later collaboration with Craig Smith (1993), both
believe that anger is caused by an appraisal of “other-blame,” which they
claim can be broken into three separate components: motivational relevance
(the situation is personally relevant), motivational incongruence (the
situation is inconsistent with what is desired), and other-accountability (the
emotion is directed at someone else). Philosophers have roughly concurred.
4 In his recent paper, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a
Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility” David Shoemaker offers a similar argument that
distinguishes among moral responsibility concepts, though without a focus on the
blaming emotions (2011).
5 Most commonly, it appears that these different terms mark a difference in whether
the object of the emotion is second or third-personal. For example, see (P. F. Strawson
1982; Wallace 1994; Sommers 2007; Pereboom 2009).
6 While there has been much debate over whether or not the relevant appraisals are
cognitive, beginning with (Zajonc 1980; Lazarus 1982) and continued in (Zajonc 1984;
Lazarus 1984), that debate is orthogonal to my concerns. For an excellent recent
discussion of this issue, see (Prinz 2004, 21–51).
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For example, Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols claim that “Anger arises when
people violate autonomy norms, which are norms prohibiting harms against
persons” (2010, 122). If we make the plausible assumption that slights and
offenses both involve the violation of norms, we can see all these authors
offering a roughly similar account of the appraisal involved with the blaming
emotions, though they do disagree about how best to capture it.
While I agree that the blaming emotions have a characteristic appraisal,
the above accounts make two errors regarding it. First, these accounts fail to
pinpoint the characteristic appraisal of the blaming emotions. The early
Lazarus, as well as Prinz and Nichols, construe the appraisal too narrowly.
For example, blaming emotions are commonly elicited by harms against
nonhuman animals, violations of religious commandments, the nonharm-
ful breaking of promises and many other situations that go beyond slights
and harms against persons.7 On the other hand, the account from Lazarus
and Smith is too broad; adding up their three appraisal components (an
emotion directed toward a personally relevant situation that is inconsistent
with what is desired) does not give us the characteristic appraisal of the
blaming emotions. Such an appraisal is also compatible with sadness. We do
better if we follow James Averill, who argues that “the typical instigation to
anger is a value judgment. More than anything else, anger is an attribution
of blame” (1983, 1150) or Shaver et al., who hold that the eliciting
appraisal is that “the situation is illegitimate, wrong, unfair, contrary to
what ought to be” (1987, 1078).
I propose, then, that the way a person feeling a blaming emotion
appraises her situation is best captured as an appraisal of wrongful conduct.
This is the core appraisal of the blaming emotions, but we can break it into
constituent parts as follows:
If a person, A, feels a blaming emotion, she evaluates her situation as containing:
(i) a person, B,8 whose
(ii) action or omission
(iii) transgresses a norm on proper conduct (including, but not limited to,
moral norms, though the norm need not be codifiable by a rule)
(iv) because B is motivated by ill will or has shown insufficient concern,
(v) and A glosses B’s action as bad.9
7 Surprisingly, Prinz and Nichols themselves note the connection between blaming
emotions and harms against nonhuman animals (2010, 130).
8 In some situations A and B will be the same person.
9 I have in mind here the fact that anger has a distinctive unpleasant phenomenology
that might be glossed as “feeling ready to explode” (Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz 1994).
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This treatment of the appraisal dimension of the blaming emotions handles
the fact that we often feel the blaming emotions in response to violations
that don’t harm persons, as well as the variety of situations where we feel
blaming emotions because a person’s action violates an autonomy norm, or
is a demeaning offense or personal slight.
This is an improvement, but there is another error in the above treat-
ments of the appraisal involved in the blaming emotions. All of the above
treatments construe the relation between the appraisal and the blaming
emotions as a causal relation. That is, the appraisal is what brings about the
blaming emotion. This is the second mistake in the literature about the
relation between the blaming emotions and their characteristic appraisal.
Not all psychologists believe that appraisals always precede blaming emo-
tions or are necessary for them; indeed there is not clear evidence that
appraisals always cause episodes of the blaming emotions, though there is
no question they often do (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004a; Berkowitz
and Harmon-Jones 2004b; Parkinson 1999).
I think we better understand the psychology of a person feeling a
blaming emotion if we hold that the blaming emotions need not be caused
by their characteristic appraisal (though they often are). However they are
caused, the blaming emotions are an appraisal of conduct as wrongful.
Consider, by analogy, a particular belief: my belief that it is sunny outside.
While my belief that it is sunny outside might be caused by present sun
outdoors (if I was just outside and noticed the weather), that belief might be
caused in a number of other ways. I might come to believe it is sunny
outside based on your testimony or by inferring today’s weather based on
what the weather was yesterday. In these cases my belief that it is sunny
outside isn’t caused by occurrent sun. A similar point applies to the
blaming emotions. While in many cases they are caused by their character-
istic appraisal, their link to appraisal is better understood as conceptual
(Parkinson 1997).
This analogy between beliefs and the blaming emotions is also relevant
because it relates to our practice of taking our blaming emotions to be
appropriate or inappropriate, depending on their aptness for the situation.
The blaming emotions are not unique in this respect. As Justin D’Arms and
Dan Jacobson have pointed out, we commonly argue about whether or not
things are sad, enviable, shameful, or worthy of pride or resentment. Our
practice of considering these issues of emotional appropriateness presup-
poses that we can make sense of whether or not an emotion’s characteristic
appraisal is accurate, or to use their terminology, fitting (2000). When a
blaming emotion is fitting, it accurately presents its object as having the
features contained by its appraisal; the fittingness of a blaming emotion is
analogous to the epistemic relation that obtains between the world and a
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true belief. Anger, resentment, and indignation are fitting to feel when, for
example, someone intentionally wrongs you out of ill will.
Thus, the blaming emotions are fitting when they are felt in response to a
person who satisfies conditions (i)-(v), above. The lack of any one of the
five conditions means that a blaming emotion is unfitting.10 We can also
distinguish between “degrees” of fit between a blaming emotion and the
situation it appraises. I should be angrier with someone who tries to ruin
my career than a neighbor who thoughtlessly mows his lawn at 8 a.m. on a
Sunday morning. And you should be more upset with the driver who
intentionally tries to run you over while you are out for a walk than you
should be with a person who somewhat carelessly backs his car into your
path. Thus, the seriousness of the wrong in question and the person’s
relation to the wrong both help to determine the amount of anger fitting
for the situation.
3 . COMMUNICATION
There is much psychological evidence to suggest that the blaming emotions
not only appraise the conduct of others, but also play a role in communi-
cation. Specific speech patterns (including rate of articulation, intensity,
and frequency of vocal fold vibrations) appear to be associated with
different emotions, particularly anger (Scherer 1986; Scherer et al. 1991).
Psychologists have also found that different bodily movements and
postures are associated with different emotions (Wallbott 1998). Perhaps
most probatively, the blaming emotions, just like many other emotions, are
associated with characteristic facial expressions (Ekman 1999). Relevantly,
while people commonly interpret the emotional facial expressions of others
as signifying a person’s appraisal of her situation, anger expressions are
more likely than the expression of other emotions to be interpreted as
conveying intentions or requests (Horstmann 2003). Also notably, the
characteristic facial expressions of different emotions appear to be highly
associated with interpersonal interaction. For example, winners on the
medal stand at the Olympic games are more likely to smile during
interactions with other people than during the rest of the ceremony
10 By distinguishing between the five conditions on the fittingness of a blaming
emotion, I call our attention to conceptual distinctions. However, I allow that these
different aspects of a blaming emotion’s appraisal may often, or even always, affect each
other in interesting ways. For example, it may be that someone’s act motivated by ill
will—even if she does something that I know has no chance of actually harming
anyone—itself transgresses a norm on proper conduct and is therefore bad.
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(Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda 1995) and bowlers are less likely to smile
when they first roll a strike than when they turn to face others watching at
the end of the alley (Kraut and Johnston 1979).
In a typical interpersonal episode of a blaming emotion, various bodily,
vocal, and facial responses communicate that the person feeling the emo-
tion is angry and thereby give the person who is the target of the blaming
emotion information about the way her conduct is being appraised. In
many situations, this information is not contained in spoken words but is
transmitted instead by the overall emotional demeanor of the person feeling
the blaming emotion. These communicative aspects of a person’s emo-
tional demeanor are observed, responded to, or ignored by others. The
responses of others—or the lack of a response—are then an opportunity for
continued emotional engagement and transformation. Thus, in most inter-
personal interactions, a person who feels a blaming emotion not only
appraises the conduct of another as wrongful, she also communicates to
the target of the blaming emotion that she construes his behavior as
wrongful.11
In human psychological response, these communicative aspects are very
closely connected to the having of the blaming emotion itself. It turns out to
be almost impossible not to register your emotional state on your face in
some way, even if briefly, and it is hardest to mask negative emotions (Porter
and Brinke 2008). Since others are extremely attentive to such displays, it is
often better to try not to have the emotion than to allow the emotion to run
its course while attempting to mask what you feel. Thus, I want to suggest
that the communicative significance of the blaming emotions can sometimes
result in their being inappropriate to feel even when they fittingly appraise a
target. That is, there are additional considerations that bear on whether to
have a blaming emotion than merely considerations of fit. In characterizing
communicative considerations that bear on emotional appropriateness, I am
inclined to follow Angela Smith in distinguishing between considerations of
standing, the degree of fault displayed in the wrongful action, and the
response that the blamed person takes (or will, or could take) to the person
who feels the blaming emotion.12
Whether or not someone has proper standing, or authority, to feel what
would be a fitting blaming emotion toward a wrongdoer has much to do
11 To be clear, I am not arguing that the communication of this information is
intentional on the part of the person feeling the blaming emotion, only that the infor-
mation is “there for the taking.” Along similar lines, the signals that indicate which play
is being called by a team may transmit the same information to the opposing team if the
opposing team has attended to which signals are reliable signs of particular plays.
12 My discussion of these three issues is indebted to (A. M. Smith 2007, 478–83).
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with her relationship to the wrongdoer and those who are wronged. So, for
example, even though I may observe what I regard as condescending and
obnoxious behavior from one of two parties having a public argument,
I may be inappropriately angry with the offending party if I have no social
connection to either one of them. We can see this more clearly when we
consider that it would not be uncommon for the victim of the obnoxious
behavior to become angry with me when my indignation on his behalf
becomes known.
My own fault and hypocrisy can also affect my standing to react to
another’s conduct with a blaming emotion. Thus, if my awareness of its
health effects has not moderated my long-time smoking habit, my friend
with a drinking problem will regard as out-of-line my fitting anger at him
for neglecting his health when he succumbs to the temptation to drink. My
friend’s failing, just as my own, may be a legitimately moral one, but the
fact that I am unable or unwilling to similarly guide my own behavior
makes it inappropriate to feel angry toward him even though anger is fitting
for what he does.
Beside the fact that the communicative appropriateness of the blaming
emotions can be undermined by my standing to have such responses, it can
also be affected by the relative significance of the fault a person displays in her
conduct. Thus, while a blaming emotion would fittingly appraise a student
who fails to keep his scheduled appointment with me, the degree of fault
(simple forgetfulness) and the degree of harm to me (a very mild inconveni-
ence) prohibit me from feeling any resentment toward him. We can see this
interact with another communicatively salient factor—the agent’s own
response—if we suppose that the student rushes over to my office, apologiz-
ing profusely even as he walks in the door. The student’s self-reproach
indicates that he understands he did wrong and is committed to doing
what he can to prevent it from occurring in the future.While being indignant
would fittingly appraise his faulty conduct, I should not feel indignant
toward him because it would be communicatively inappropriate for me to
target him with a blaming emotion given his indication that he understands
his error and the importance of keeping appointments.13 (Of course, things
might be different if this same student has routinely missed appointments
even while protesting that it will never happen again.)
In such a case, we again have a communicative reason against feeling a
blaming emotion, even though the blaming emotions fittingly appraise the
actions of the person in the situation.
13 For an analysis of the communicative dimension of emotions supporting this
claim, see (Macnamara forthcoming).
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4. SANCTION
Another way in which the blaming emotions are significant for our moral
responsibility practices relates to communication but is ultimately distinct,
namely, affecting the behavior of others by imposing costs.14 While this is
sometimes accomplished via the communication of a message, at other
times it is accomplished simply through changing the costs and benefits of
another person’s possible actions. Though the relationship between the
blaming emotions, deliberation, and action-aimed-at-sanction is complex,
in this section I will highlight some of the relevant psychological findings to
demonstrate the connection of the blaming emotions to sanction.
Anger has important effects on deliberation and social perception that play
a role in determining the behavior of someone feeling a blaming emotion
(though the effects vary across individuals, depending on their level of
awareness and cognitive skills). Angry people tend to have a sense of signifi-
cant control (Lerner and Keltner 2000) that leads them to be optimistic about
the success of their probable actions (Lerner and Keltner 2001). They are also
“eager to make decisions and are unlikely to stop and ponder or carefully
analyze” (Lerner and Tiedens 2006, 132), which likely leads them to take
actions that have a low probability of succeeding but high payoffs (Leith and
Baumeister 1996). When they act, angry people tend to be more punitive
toward those they blame (Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock 1998).15
We can see these deliberative effects demonstrated in experimental work
on altruistic punishment and ultimatum games. In altruistic punishment,
the punisher receives no material benefit but imposes a cost on the party
punished. Thus, people are willing to punish free-riders even when it is
costly for them to do so and they cannot expect future benefits from
punishing (Fehr and Gächter 2000). Jonathan Haidt has argued that a
paradigm feature of human morality is this third-party enforcement of
moral norms (2001). In one significant study, Ernst Fehr and Simon
Gächter (2002) demonstrated that free-riding on a common good is less
prevalent when altruistic punishment of free-riders is possible. When such
punishment occurs, it is reported by punishers to express their anger and
those who are punished perceive their punishers as angry.16 A similar
14 I am not arguing that such costs are always intended by the person feeling the
blaming emotion, though they certainly sometimes are.
15 For an excellent overview of recent empirical study of anger’s effects on judgment
and decision-making, see (Litvak et al. 2010).
16 Notably, angry sanctions lead to positive behavior change even when free-riders
interact with a new group of people that does not include their previous punishers.
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finding concerns experimental work on ultimatum games. In such two-
person games, one party (suppose it’s me) controls some resources (say,
$10) and makes an offer to another to split the resources in a particular
fashion with another party ($8 for me, $2 for you). You have the opportunity
to accept or reject the offer. Although game theory would predict that the
splits offered should heavily favor the person controlling the resources and
that all offers should be accepted, people tend to offer more than 40 percent
of the resources and 15 to 20 percent of offers are rejected (Ochs and Roth
1989). The most perspicuous explanation of this behavior is that people
expect the splits to be fair; if they are not, the split is angrily rejected even
though the rejection leaves the rejector worse off than had she accepted
(Pillutla and Murnighan 1996). Because ‘offerers’ anticipate the possibility
of sanctioning reactions, they tend to offer more equitable splits.
I’ve been using sanction to specifically demarcate the cost-imposing
function of the blaming emotions from the communicative aspect. As
I argued above, one function of the blaming emotions is to communicate
appraisals to others. While one way to bring about a change in another
person’s behavior is to successfully communicate an appraisal to them, the
communication will ultimately only be successful if the other is willing to
appraise herself as acting wrongfully and see her wrongness as a reason for
change, apology, or restitution. However, even if the other person is
unwilling or unable to see herself as acting wrongfully, placing a cost on
particular ways she might behave can impact her chosen course of action.
The threat of sanction can lead someone to refrain from a wrongful action
not yet performed, not repeat a wrong he already performed, or not copy
the successful wrongdoing of others. Importantly, I also assume that
expressions of the blaming emotions, themselves, are experienced as sanc-
tions by the emotion’s target. Not only is it unpleasant in its own right to be
the target of another person’s blaming emotion, but Baumeister et al.
suggest that one function of the blaming emotions may be to stimulate
guilt in the person who is the target of the emotion (2007, 189). Thus,
people tend to avoid actions that they know would lead to being the target
of the blaming emotions of others in order to avoid psychological and
physical sanctions.17
There are a number of considerations that bear on the appropriateness of
the blaming emotions qua sanction, some of which we have touched on
17 Again, note that while the sanctioning effects of the blaming emotions are at least
sometimes directly intended by people who feel a blaming emotion (Fehr and Gächter
2000), they need not always be. However, even if people feeling blaming emotions do
not intend that their emotions be experienced as harms by the targets of the blaming
emotion, that doesn’t mean they are not experienced as such by the targets.
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already. Again, the lesson is that the question of whether a blaming emotion
is appropriate, all things considered, is not solely determined by whether or
not the blaming emotion fittingly appraises someone’s conduct. For
example, the propriety of sanctioning someone with a blaming emotion
can be affected by the seriousness of the wrong done. Just as with commu-
nicative appropriateness, some extremely minor wrongs ought not be
responded to, while the propriety of sanctioning a wrongdoer may increase
with the seriousness of the wrong.18 The person’s own repentance, or lack
thereof, is relevant because sanctioning an already repentant person may be
unnecessary to affect his future conduct.
As each of us has only limited motivational and actional resources, the
appropriateness of a blaming emotion qua sanction can also be affected by
what other wrongs you might plausibly respond to. For example, you do
better to get angry with the perpetrators of wrongs when you might
successfully undo the wrong or positively influence the perpetrator. If,
hypothetically, you became aware of two different wrongs committed by
two different people that were approximately as severe, your blaming
emotions would be better directed toward a wrongdoer who would be
more swayed by the communicative and motivational significance of your
blaming emotions. Thus, there is something to the phenomenon where
people are more likely to feel a blaming emotion in response to a wrong
that directly affects them or someone they know well, rather than a wrong
that affects persons with whom they have little contact. Other things equal,
your motivational resources are more likely to lead to beneficial outcomes if
you address concerns with which you can profitably engage.19
A related, but distinct, issue concerns what I will term the fairness of
sanctioning a wrongdoer with a blaming emotion. We can see this notion
displayed first by returning to the phenomenon of hypocrisy, earlier raised
in reference to the communicative appropriateness of a blaming emotion. If
you habitually commit a certain type of wrong, your right to sanction
others with the blaming emotions for similar wrongs will be called into
question—especially if you protest the sanction of the blaming emotions
when it is applied to you. Similarly, if two people jointly undertake to
commit a wrong (say, robbing someone’s home) but one of them plays
18 I say “may” increase because I am doubtful that the relative deservingness of a
wrongdoer, itself, is a sufficient reason to license a sanction for her. Explaining why
would require that I develop a theory of desert and deservingness, which is a topic for
elsewhere. For reasons why I am skeptical that desert can be a sufficient justification for
sanctions, see (Dolinko 1991a; Dolinko 1991b).
19 Technological advances that give you knowledge of wrongs done to little-known
people far away don’t contradict this point, though they do complicate it considerably.
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more of a role in planning and executing the deed than the other, it is
appropriate to sanction the “mastermind” to a greater degree with a
blaming emotion. Thus, if you must choose where to direct your blaming
emotions, fairness considerations speak to you blaming the mastermind
more than the accomplice. I believe the notion of the unfairness of blaming
emotions qua sanction also accounts for our appropriate reluctance to
blame the victims of wrongs or injustices, even if the victims of such wrongs
are complicit in, or partially responsible for, the wrongdoing. In such a
situation, targeting the person who was wronged with a blaming emotion
amounts to piling another bad thing on top of whatever misfortune the
person has already suffered.
5 . LINKING ACCOUNTS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
TO THE THREE FUNCTIONS
To this point, I have argued that the blaming emotions are significant for
our moral responsibility practices as appraisals, communications, and
sanctions. I have also argued that the appropriateness of a blaming emotion
in one sense does not guarantee that the blaming emotion is appropriate in
others. I have particularly focused on situations where a blaming emotion
fittingly appraises another’s conduct but is at the same time communi-
catively inappropriate or is inappropriate as a sanction. I do not take myself
to have exhausted all possible appropriateness considerations that bear on
these three functions, though I do hope to have captured many of the most
interesting and relevant appropriateness considerations for our practices of
moral responsibility. I now want to discuss several prominent accounts of
moral responsibility to suggest that differing accounts of moral responsi-
bility are motivated by attention to different ways in which the blaming
emotions are significant for moral responsibility.20
The notion that the blaming emotions involve appraisals of conduct as
wrongful is implicit in a number of theories of moral responsibility. For
example, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza hold that someone is
morally responsible for her conduct to the extent that she is an “appropriate
candidate for at least some of the reactive attitudes on the basis of that
behavior” (1998, 6). Fischer and Ravizza admit that “in some contexts it
20 While this project seeks to locate the source of agreements and disputes about the
concept of moral responsibility, my own view is that considerations of fit are the only
appropriateness conditions of the blaming emotions that bear on a person’s moral
responsibility because these considerations circumscribe the concept of blameworthiness.
Unfortunately, I don’t have space to make that case here.
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may not be justified or appropriate, all things considered, actually to have
any reactive attitude to a particular agent” who is nonetheless morally
responsible for her conduct (1998, 7).21 Thus, their theory of moral
responsibility needs a sense of appropriateness for the blaming emotions
that can be apt, even if feeling a blaming emotion is not, all things
considered, appropriate. I believe that the fittingness of a blaming
emotion’s appraisal is the notion they are searching for.
Fittingness also allows us to make sense of R. J. Wallace’s idea that
resentment, indignation, and anger share a distinct propositional object,
namely, that “an expectation to which one holds a person has been
breached” (1994, 12). The blaming emotions, Wallace believes, are
fundamental to understanding the nature of moral responsibility. Coleen
Macnamara has also recently noted the connection between the blaming
emotions, appraisal and moral responsibility. When a person resents
her brother for not helping her move as he had promised, Macnamara
notes, her resentment is “a particularly deep form of moral appraisal” that
responds to the meaning of the brother’s insensitive action (2009, 89).
This sense of appraisal is, on her view, one face of holding others morally
responsible. Angela Smith has also recently urged that the fundamental
question of responsibility is whether an action can be attributed to a
person “in a way that makes moral appraisal, in principle, appropriate”
(2007, 470) and that negative moral appraisal, in terms of a judgment
of culpability, is entailed by feeling a blaming emotion like anger,
resentment, or indignation toward someone on the basis of her conduct
(2007, 467).
These views about the nature of moral responsibility are all unified in
taking the fittingness of the blaming emotions to be connected to ascrip-
tions of moral responsibility. Some, like Smith, hold that the question of
whether a person is morally responsible for her conduct just is the question
of whether an appraisal like that of the blaming emotions is fitting for
someone on the basis of her conduct.22 Others, like Macnamara, hold that
this is one significant aspect of our practice of holding others responsible,
but that it is not the only one. Macnamara argues that another important
“face” of moral responsibility is found in communicative acts (2009, 90).
Several theorists beside Macnamara have developed accounts of moral
responsibility that exploit the communicative function of the blaming
emotions. Thus, Gary Watson urges “the negative reactive attitudes express
21 On their terminology, the blaming emotions are clearly reactive attitudes.
22 Thus, as I read Smith’s account, the question of someone’s moral responsibility is a
question of the fittingness of certain appraisals, but is not a question of the fittingness of
emotions.
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a moral demand, a demand for reasonable regard . . . the reactive attitudes
are incipiently forms of communication” (1993, 264). Taking up and
extending Watson’s idea, Michael McKenna claims that
holding another morally responsible for doing morally wrong is a manner of
communicating with her. In particular, it is a manner of responding to what she
had done as on analogy with a conversation in which the blameworthy person’s
conduct has a significance . . . for her to be blameworthy is for her to be a fitting
target of this manner of response, for her to be one with whom the relevant sort of
communication is called for. (2004, 187–8)
Stephen Darwall concurs that the blaming emotions are communicative.
He appeals to the idea that when I feel a blaming emotion in response to
you stepping on—and then continuing to stand on—my foot, my feeling
the blaming emotion is in part a demand that you remove your foot from
mine (Darwall 2006, 17). Even theorists like Angela Smith, who do not
regard the blaming emotions as fundamental to ascriptions of moral
responsibility, hold that the appraisal of another’s conduct as wrongful
has a communicative dimension. She writes, “Moral criticism, by its very
nature, seems to address a demand to its target. It calls upon the agent to
explain or justify her rational activity in some area, and to acknowledge
fault if such a justification cannot be provided” (2006, 381).
Finally, some other accounts of moral responsibility bring the sanction-
ing function to the fore. So, for example, Galen Strawson holds that in
asking whether people are morally responsible, we are asking if they are
responsible for their actions in such a way that they are, without any sort of
qualification, morally deserving of praise or blame or punishment or reward for
them. (2002, 441)
Note how Strawson thinks the question of moral responsibility just is the
question of whether a person is deserving of sanctions like punishment, and
that he must have the sanctioning function of blame (as an attitude) in
mind if he is to think that whether someone deserves blame or punishment
amounts to the same question.
Echoing Strawson’s claim that the question of moral responsibility is a
question of deservingness “without qualification,” Derk Pereboom claims
that
For an agent to be morally responsible for an action is for it to belong to her in such
a way that she would deserve blame if she understood that it was morally wrong, and
she would deserve credit or perhaps praise if she understood that it was morally
exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent, to be morally
responsible, would deserve the blame or credit just because she has performed the
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action (given that she understands its moral status), and not by virtue of conse-
quentialist considerations. (2007, 86).23
Also placing the sanctioning function at the fore of their analyses are
Tamler Sommers and Neil Levy who, like Galen Strawson, are skeptics
about desert-entailing moral responsibility.24 Sommers claims that “we feel
resentment when we feel that people have wronged us, and that they
deserve blame (and perhaps punishment) for what they did” (2007, 327).
Levy agrees that moral responsibility has a link to desert, but that the
connection between moral responsibility and deserved sanction is less
direct than Strawson and Sommers believe. On Levy’s view, the thought
that someone is morally responsible for wrongful acts she performs
amounts to the claim that such a person no longer deserves the full
protection of a right they would otherwise be entitled to: “a right against
having their interests discounted in consequentialist calculations” (2011, 3).
To have one’s interests discounted in such calculations is to incur a cost on
acting wrongfully: a sanction.
6 . CONCLUSION
In this paper, I’ve argued that the blaming emotions relate to our practices
of holding people morally responsible in three different ways: appraisal,
communication, and sanction. I’ve shown that these ways in which the
blaming emotions are significant for our moral responsibility practices are
themselves associated with distinct considerations of appropriateness (fit-
tingness, communicative appropriateness, and appropriateness qua sanc-
tion) and that these different considerations can come apart from one
another. A blaming emotion can be fitting, for example, but inappropriate
qua communicative considerations or fitting yet inappropriate as a sanc-
tion. Finally, I’ve suggested that the different functions of the blaming
emotions and their characteristic conditions of appropriateness are quite
23 Pereboom has been consistently advocating this account of the conditions of
appropriateness for moral responsibility since the publication of Living Without Free
Will (2001). I interpret Pereboom as being concerned with a sanction-based understand-
ing of blame due to his emphasis on the potentially harmful effects of anger (Pereboom
2011).
24 This “accountability” face of moral responsibility has also been emphasized by
Gary Watson (1996). Watson also characterizes another, aretaic, face of responsibility
that involves beliefs or judgments about where someone’s conduct falls against some
standard. His discussion bears some similarity to my account of the appraisal function of
the blaming emotions. However, I am uncertain whether our analyses perfectly line up.
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naturally seen as inspiring corresponding accounts of moral responsibility,
itself.
I think this goes some distance toward accounting for the fact that there
is so little agreement about the nature of moral responsibility, even after so
much attention to it. In my view, all the accounts I’ve discussed get
something right about the moral psychology of moral responsibility and
its associated conditions of appropriateness, but they also ignore other
important features of our moral responsibility practices. My analysis sug-
gests moral responsibility may be best captured as a prototype concept:
when we hold people morally responsible in normal interpersonal inter-
actions, our responses typically conform to archetypal emotional reactions
that involve all three aspects of the blaming emotions. If we aim to have a
psychologically realistic picture of our moral responsibility practices,
I believe we must have a tripartite theory. Thus, in response to the
voluminous literature defending fittingness, communication, or sanction
as the correct account of moral responsibility, my analysis suggests that
such attempts require additional argument. There is little to be gained for
supporting one account over another as the correct account of moral
responsibility without some attention to our purpose in raising the question
of someone’s moral responsibility in a given context.
It’s also no surprise on my analysis that theorists who emphasize different
emotional functions in their characterization of moral responsibility dis-
agree about the conditions under which people are morally responsible for
what they do. In particular, we find a ready division between incompatibi-
lists, who tend to emphasize the sanctioning function, and compatibilists,
who tend to emphasize the appraisal and communicative functions.
Moving forward with respect to points of dispute between the camps
may be aided by further attention to the moral psychology of the blaming
emotions and their conditions of appropriateness. In particular, I want to
suggest that if we often implicitly attend to the different conditions of
emotional appropriateness in our moral lives, our intuitive judgments
about when people are morally responsible will be influenced by those
considerations. Further, I expect that this influence will also be present
when we think about people’s moral responsibility in the context of
philosophical thought experiments. This is a speculative claim, but it
bears investigation, particularly in light of recent work on implicit and
affective psychological process.25
25 For an overview of some of the relevant empirical data, see (Bargh and Chartrand
1999).
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There is no question that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment”
looms large over investigations into moral responsibility. One way in which
Strawson influenced current debates is by motivating the idea that attribu-
tions of moral responsibility can be helpfully understood as “natural human
reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us”
(P. F. Strawson 1982, 53). I have here restricted my attention to just one
set of natural human reactions, namely, the blaming emotions. If my
account is plausible, these reactions to the quality of other’s wills are a
matter of significant complexity. Theorizing about moral responsibility
must respect these intricacies if we are to progress.26
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Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter (2000). “Cooperation and Punishment in Public
Goods Experiments.” The American Economic Review 90 (4): 980–94.
——.(2002). “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature 415, 137–40.
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